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campaign, the operations near Salonika, the Bagdad Railroad, and the whole Mittel-Europa scheme. More than once he succeeds in showing the real reasons of things; many times he warns effectually against hasty judgments.

Mr. Woods has written a book of prime importance, a book that repays and rewards study. Its balanced and guarded conclusions will be found, on reflection, to be more illuminating by far than the quickly assimilated ideas of political essay-writers. Its facts are first-hand facts, and they are invaluable.

FROM ISOLATION TO LEADERSHIP. By John Holladay Latané, professor of American History in the Johns Hopkins University. Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Company.

In regard to the American policy of isolation there has been much misapprehension among Americans. It was against "permanent," not "entangling alliances" that Washington warned his countrymen and he did not discountenance temporary alliances to meet special needs. The policy of isolation he regarded, moreover, as itself a temporary expedient. Jefferson, who was the originator of the "entangling alliances" phrase, was on two separate occasions ready to make an alliance with England.

Indeed, it is probable, according to the view of Professor Latané, that neither Washington nor Jefferson "contemplated the possibility of the United States' shirking its responsibility as a member of the family of nations."

Part of the misapprehension regarding this matter has been due to a not unnatural confusion of the policy of isolation with the Monroe Doctrine. Since the latter policy implied a promise that we would keep our fingers out of the European pie, one might readily assume that we were debarred by it from taking any real part in world affairs; but to refrain from interference or aggression, is not the same thing as declining to do one's duty. As Professor Latané says, "there is neither logic nor justice in basing our right to uphold law and freedom in this hemisphere on our promise not to interfere with the violation of law and humanity in Europe."

Moreover, it is an error to suppose that the Monroe Doctrine has depended for its actual effect upon our policy of isolation. It has depended, in fact, upon the European balance of power. It was the approach of the Schleswig-Holstein war, as much as the traditional policy of the United States or its then formidable military force, which induced Louis Napoleon to withdraw Maximilian from Mexico. It was the foreboding of trouble in the Transvaal, rather than his "sense of humor," which caused Lord Salisbury to give way on the Venezuelan question. And it is only because England has, on the whole, favored the Monroe Doctrine, as a kind of open-door policy, that we have been able to maintain that doctrine at all.

Two conclusions, rather surprising to the ordinary reader, emerge from Professor Latané's discussion. The first is that "we have been so scrupulous in our efforts to keep out of political entanglements that we have sometimes failed to uphold principles of law in the validity

of which we were as much concerned as any other nation." The second is that we have taken a larger part in international affairs than most persons are aware. Sometimes our policy was rendered futile for want of force to back it, as in the case of our Open Door Policy in China—an Anglo-American doctrine which remained a theory because we would not unite with England and Japan in an effort to maintain it, if necessary, by force. Sometimes our part has been larger than the American people at the time suspected. Has not André Tardieu stated that the Kaiser sent several telegrams to President Roosevelt, during the Algeciras conference, urging him to modify his instructions to Henry White?

On the whole our participation in the world war has not been in the least contrary to any American principle, nor has it been, except in the large employment of force, wholly out of accord with our previous practise.

Little books on great subjects, when written to order, are seldom of much use. But if scholars generally would form the habit of expressing their views in little books, and would do this as effectively and as judiciously as Professor Latané has done it, the little books would put the big books quite out of fashion. As a resumé of American foreign relations, this volume of Professor Latané's is admirable. It may be regarded, too, as in a sense a "war-aims" book; and if it has a fault, it is that in it the dismal Mexican business preceding the great war is perhaps made to seem a more reasonable and fitting part of a consistent American policy than it really was.